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Abstract 
In this paper we present the estimation results of a dynamic panel data model that explains the 
dynamic behaviour of default ratios in Spain for loans extended to the household sector. We 
estimate the models for two alternative definitions of default and for two different loan 
categories. The dataset consists of a panel of 50 provinces and covers the period 1984-2009. 
The results of the models show that the dynamic behaviour of the default ratios of loans 
extended to Spanish households can be reasonably well characterised with the lagged LHS 
variable, and the contemporaneous and the lagged values of credit growth, the unemployment 
rate and the interest debt burden. We find that the increase in the unemployment rate was 
the main driver of the sharp rise in default ratios between 2007 and 2009 in Spain and that 
the fall in interest rates since the end of 2008 contributed to moderating the upward path 
of default ratios in 2009. We also find that there is strong evidence of asymmetrical effects of 
unemployment ratios on default ratios, and differences between banks and savings banks in 
their sensitivity to the cycle.  
Keywords: Default ratios, non-performing loans, household finances, financial pressure. 
JEL Classification: D14, C23, G21. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
En este artículo se presentan los resultados de estimar modelos dinámicos de datos de 
panel, que explican la evolución dinámica de los ratios de morosidad de los créditos a los 
hogares en España. Estimamos modelos separados para dos definiciones distintas de 
morosidad y para dos segmentos de créditos diferentes. La muestra está constituida por un 
panel de las 50 provincias a lo largo del período 1984-2009. Los resultados de estos 
modelos muestran que el comportamiento dinámico de los ratios de morosidad se puede 
describir a partir de esa misma variable desfasada, y los valores contemporáneos y 
retardados del crecimiento del crédito, de la tasa de paro y de la carga financiera por 
intereses. Encontramos que los incrementos del desempleo han sido los principales 
responsables del fuerte aumento de las ratios de morosidad entre 2007 y 2009 en España y 
que la caída de los tipos de interés desde finales de 2008 ha contribuido a moderar en 2009 
esa tendencia creciente. También encontramos fuerte evidencia de los efectos asimétricos 
de la tasa de paro sobre la morosidad, así como diferencias en la sensibilidad al ciclo entre 
los créditos concedidos por bancos y cajas de ahorros. 
Palabras claves: Ratios de morosidad, créditos dudosos, posición financiera de las familias, 
presión financiera. 
Códigos JEL: D14, C23, G21. 
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1 Introduction 
The monitoring of the ability of the private sector to repay its debts is important for both 
macroeconomic and financial stability. In particular, from the macroeconomic perspective, a 
rise in the proportion of households or companies who cannot repay their debts is a sign of 
an increase in financial pressure for these agents, which might ultimately have an adverse 
impact on their expenditure decisions. The same developments will have a negative effect on 
financial institutions’ profits due to the increase in non-performing loans, which may adversely 
impact financial stability. This, in turn, can have a second-round effect on macroeconomic 
developments if the ability of banks to lend is affected by this shock.  
Naturally, macroeconomic developments are an important driver of the ability of 
agents to repay their debts. In particular, during economic expansions income tends to 
increase at a high rate, improving the ability of borrowers to afford debt service payments. 
On the contrary, during recessions the ability to repay debt deteriorates due to the low 
increase in income and, in the case of households, due to the rise in unemployment. The 
recent sharp increase in non-performing loans in Spain and other countries clearly 
illustrates the impact of the cycle on this variable. In fact, the relevance of the global rise in 
default ratios has recently attracted fresh attention to this issue (see Demyanyk and 
Hemert, 2009, or Mayer et al., 2009). 
Against this background, in this paper we analyse the macroeconomic determinants 
of the ability of Spanish households to repay their debts. We focus on two different measures 
of default: i) the ratio of the outstanding amount of defaulted loans (i.e. those that are doubtful 
or in arrears) to total loans to the household sector, and ii) the percentage of borrowers with 
defaulted loans. The first measure is more important for financial stability analyses, whereas 
from the macroeconomic perspective the second measure is perhaps more relevant. As a 
matter of fact, the latter measure tends to show a higher correlation with macroeconomic 
variables such as consumption and real-estate investment. For both measures, we split the 
loans into two different categories: i) loans with real guarantees (secured) and ii) loans without 
real guarantees (unsecured). This distinction makes sense given the different level and 
dynamics of the two ratios analysed in the paper. 
For each default variable and loan category, we estimate a model using panel data of 
50 Spanish provinces for the period 1984 to 2009. The use of regional data, which is 
uncommon in the literature, allows us to exploit the regional variability of these data, alleviating 
the problem of the relatively short time period for which data are available. The methodology 
used is a dynamic panel data (DPD) estimation. Default ratios are obtained from the Central 
Credit Register (CCR) of the Banco de España. This database collects individual information 
on all loans over 6,000 Euros granted to resident borrowers by the credit institutions 
domiciled in Spain. Since this threshold is very low, we can safely assume that we have data 
on virtually every loan granted in Spain (Jiménez and Mencía, 2009). This database includes 
different characteristics of each loan and each borrower, such as type of risk, economic 
activity of the borrower, guarantees, location, holder’s nature, period of payments and time 
(see Jiménez and Saurina, 2004, and Jiménez et al., 2006, for a thorough description). 
Previous empirical studies on the determinants of household non-performing loans in 
Spain and other countries have found that the cycle, proxied by the GDP and/or the 
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unemployment rate, and interest rates or the ratio of debt service to income are the main 
drivers of this variable. Others have also found that a high level of indebtedness is associated 
with a high level of non-performing loans (Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano, 2006; Figueira et al., 
2005). Some papers based on UK data have also found that the loan-to-value ratio and/or 
the percentage of undrawn mortgage equity are negatively correlated with the percentage of 
mortgages in arrears (Figueira et al., 2005; Whitley et al., 2004). Various papers also found 
that a high growth of credit is associated with an increase in the non-performing loan ratio 
several years later (Delgado and Saurina (2004), and Martínez-Peón and Saurina (2000) for 
the private sector’s non-performing loans). 
The empirical studies have used a variety of different methodologies. Most papers 
estimate an Error Correction Model using macro data (Delgado and Saurina (2004), using 
Spanish data; Rinaldi and Sanchis-Arellano (2006), using data for various euro area countries; 
Whitley et al. (2004) and Figueira et al., (2005), using UK data). A further group of papers uses 
micro data and estimates a dynamic probit (May and Tudela (2005) using UK data; and Gross 
and Souleles (2002) using US data). Finally, other papers (Martínez-Peón and Saurina, 2000; 
Salas and Saurina, 2002) have used a dynamic panel data methodology. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use Spanish regional data to 
estimate default ratios for households and the first paper to use a definition of default based 
on the number of borrowers with defaulted loans in Spain. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 
describes developments in the variables analysed in the paper, Section 3 presents the 
empirical model and the data, Section 4 summarises the main results and Section 5 presents 
alternative models distinguishing between banks and savings banks, and models with 
asymmetrical effects of changes in the unemployment ratio. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
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2 Changes in household default ratios in Spain 
In this paper we use two alternative definitions of default. The first is the standard definition of 
the non-performing loan ratio, which we will refer to as the default ratio based on the size of 
the loans (DRSL)1:  
ܦܴܵܮ ൌ ை௨௧௦௧௔௡ௗ௜௡௚ ௟௢௔௡௦ ௖௟௔௦௦௜௙௜௘ௗ ௔௦ ௗ௢௨௕௧௙௨௟ ௢௥ ௜௡ ௔௥௥௘௔௥௦்௢௧௔௟ ை௨௧௦௧௔௡ௗ௜௡௚ ௟௢௔௡௦                                  (1) 
This is one of the key standard variables used to assess the quality of the assets of 
the banking system and it is especially relevant for financial stability purposes. However, since 
this variable is measured in terms of the size of loans rather than the number of loans or 
borrowers involved, it does not offer a good measure of how widespread defaults are among 
households. Therefore, in this paper we also use an alternative measure: the default ratio 
based on the number of borrowers (DRNB):  
borrowersofnumberTotal
arrears in or doubtful as classified loanswithBorrowersDRNB                   (2) 
which is possibly a better proxy for the financial pressure on the household sector. In fact, 
DRNB has a stronger relationship with macroeconomic variables than the DRSL (the 
correlation with consumption is.59 vs. .57, and with real-estate investment it is .73 vs. .69). 
For both default measures (DRSL and DRNB) we consider separately the loans in 
two different categories: i) secured loans and ii) unsecured loans. Jiménez and Mencía (2009) 
identify those types of loans with mortgages and consumption purposes, respectively. House 
purchases usually entail big outlays that require loans of a bigger size and longer maturity, 
and, therefore, they are generally collateralised by the house purchased (mortgages) in order 
to reduce the payment of interests. By contrast, consumption is usually financed by loans 
without collateral, entailing a lower amount and a shorter repayment period. The differences in 
loan characteristics, too, on the consequences in the event of default could mean very 
different default dynamics for both types of debt. 
Figure 1 displays the two alternative default measures for the two debt classes (DRSL 
in the left-hand panel and DRNB in the right-hand one) together with the unemployment rate 
during the sample period used in this paper (1984-2009). The figure clearly illustrates the cyclical 
pattern of both the non-performing household loans rate and the percentage of households with 
loans in arrears. In particular, both variables tend to rise when the unemployment rate increases 
and tend to fall when the unemployment rate falls. The first variable (DRSL) seems to show a 
higher variability with the cycle compared to the second one (DRNB). This is likely to reflect the 
fact that the probability of default is more sensitive to shocks for relatively new loans, which tend 
to be of higher amount, as compared to older loans. 
As regards debt classes, Figure 1 shows that both DRSL and DRNB tend to show 
both a higher level and a much higher variability with the cycle for unsecured loans than for 
those related to secured loans. The lower probability of default of secured loans reflects the 
                                                                          
1. Doubtful loans and loans in arrears are defined in annex 1. Note that this measure excludes write-offs, which remain 
on the CCR database as long as the debt continues to be neither reimbursed nor extinguished. 
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lower incentives to default on this class of debt, since in the event of default borrowers can 
lose their guarantee, which is normally their dwelling (mortgage loans). Also, contrary to other 
countries, like the US, lenders in Spain are allowed to use both the future earnings and other 
assets of the debtor to repay past debts, meaning that borrowers have fewer incentives to 
default on their debts. 
Recent developments in default ratios show a sharp increase since 2007, which 
has coincided with the recession of the Spanish economy, after a long period in which 
these variables had decreased and stabilised at very low levels. At the end of the sample, 
they stood below their peaks during the two previous crises (at the beginning of the 80’s 
and in 1992-93). 
Figures 2 and 3 show that default ratios display a relatively high dispersion by 
province both in levels and in terms of changes. The dispersion in levels is higher when 
default ratios are high. One possible source of the heterogeneity in the regional data could be 
the developments in macroeconomic data. In this regard, Figure 4 shows that there is also 
some dispersion in the change in the unemployment rate. This heterogeneity suggests that 
there might be value in exploiting regional data to estimate the main macroeconomic 
determinants of default ratios, and their dynamics. 
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3 Empirical model 
In the empirical model, we use logit transformations of the default ratio variables defined in the 
previous section. More precisely, we define DRSLy  and DRNBy  as follows: 




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.                                                                    (3) 
This transformation, which is standard in the literature2, implies that the LHS 
variables are defined for all real numbers. It also implies a non-linear effect of the changes in 
the explanatory variables, the effect being greater the higher these variables, a feature which 
is normally observed in the data.  
Given the different levels and dynamics of default ratios depending on debt classes 
that we have shown in the previous section, we estimate different models for secured loans  
( sDRSLy ,  and sDRNBy , ) and for unsecured loans ( uDRSLy ,  and uDRNBy , ). For each of these 
four variables we specify a dynamic panel data model (DPD). 
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In equation 4, the logit transformation of the ratio ( ljy , ) in a given province ( i ) and 
year ( t ) depends on the previous year’s value for the same variable (to account for the 
possibility of inertia in the changes in this variable), as well as other contemporaneous and 
lagged variables (vector jtix , ), non-observable provincial characteristics ( i ) and an error 
term ( ti, ).  
The lagged ljy , is introduced to capture the inertia in the dynamics of these 
variables. The coefficient α ( 10   ) measures the degree of inertia. We expect default 
measures to exhibit a strong inertia since, once a loan has fallen into the non-performing 
category, it is likely to remain there for subsequent periods. In fact, it can only leave this 
category either by the borrower catching up with overdue payments when his/her financial 
position improves or when the credit institution writes off the loan completely. In either case, 
most of the portfolio of non-performing loans in one year would remain in this category the 
following year.  
The choice of explanatory variables jtikx ,,  is based on both theory and previous 
empirical papers. The first one is the Increase in the unemployment rate ( itUR ). The 
unemployment rate (UR ), which is defined as the number of unemployed workers divided by 
                                                                          
2. Salas and Saurina (2002) and Jiménez and Saurina (2006) use this transformation, while Jiménez and Mencía (2009) 
use the similar alternative Probit transformation. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1210 
the number of active people, is taken from the Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población 
Activa, EPA) of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). We expect a positive sign for 
the parameter of this variable since workers becoming unemployed, given the derived income 
drop, will experience greater difficulties in meeting their debt obligations. We have included 
the changes rather than the levels in UR, a specification which is in line with Brookes at al. 
(1994) and Figueira et al. (2005). By using this specification, we are implicitly assuming that 
what matters for the default ratios are the changes in unemployment rather than the level of 
unemployment. This assumption is based on the following. Loans are extended to those 
borrowers with a sound financial position and/or steady flows of income, and, therefore, it is 
unlikely that banks will lend to unemployed people. But once a loan has been extended, 
borrowers can become unemployed and, as a result, their ability to repay the loan can be 
affected. Therefore, the relevant magnitude is not the level of unemployment, but the inflows 
of unemployed. Some authors focus on broader measures of default that incorporate loans to 
non-financial firms, replacing the unemployment rate with GDP growth (Salas and Saurina, 
2002; Delgado and Saurina, 2004; Jiménez and Saurina, 2006; Jiménez and Mencía, 2009), 
an approach that is equivalent to some extent. 
The second explanatory variable considered is the Increase in the interest debt 
burden ( itIDB ). Variable IDB is defined as 
it
u
tu
it
u
its
ts
it
s
it
it DI
r
B
C
r
B
C
IDB
·· 
                                                                        (5) 
where sitC  and 
u
itC  are the total outstanding amount of loans secured and unsecured, 
respectively, for each province and for each year; sitB  and 
u
itB  are the number of people with 
loans both secured and unsecured in that province; itDI  is the per capita nominal disposable 
income in the same province3; and str  and 
u
tr  are the interest rates applied to the 
outstanding loans of each type of loan4. We have used a single measure of IDB, which 
captures the overall interest burden for all debts, for all models and not specific measures of 
interest debt burden for each type of loan (loans with and without guarantees), since the 
ability to repay a specific loan is not necessarily only affected by the interest burden of that 
loan. Ideally, debt burden should include not only interest payments but also principal 
repayments, yet unfortunately, the latter are neither directly observable nor easy to estimate.  
The IDB ratio, as we have defined it, summarises in one variable the impact of three 
variables: interest rates, indebtedness and household disposable income. We expect a 
positive sign for the coefficient of this variable since an increase in the relative debt burden 
would worsen the ability of households to meet their debt payments. Most papers use 
interest rates as a proxy for the interest debt burden. The advantage of our specification is 
that the impact on default ratios of changes in interest rates depends on the level of 
indebtedness (i.e. it is higher the higher the level of indebtedness), as well as on household 
                                                                          
3. Nominal disposable gross income is measured in base 1995. This information is from the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics. Population data used for transforming it in per capita terms are also obtained from the same institutions historical 
series of population (there is an interpolation of 1997 and 1999 because there was no information for this series in 1998). 
4. Although the CCR does not provide information on the interest rates applied to each loan, since 2003, the Banco de 
España’s Statistics Bulletin (Table 19.12 http://www.bde.es/infoest/a1912e.pdf) provides monthly data on the mean 
interest rate applied in Spain to outstanding loans for house purchase (that we use as a proxy of loans with guarantee) 
and loans for consume and other purposes (proxy of loans without guarantee), for maturities: less than a year, from 1 
year to 5 years, and more than 5 years. For earlier periods we have used a 1 year moving average of the interest rates 
applied to new loans. 
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disposable income. In fact, negative shocks to disposable income (i.e. an economic 
recession) would increase the interest debt burden, and eventually the pressure on the default 
ratios. The inclusion of IDB in differences rather than in levels can be justified along the same 
lines as in the case of the unemployment rate. 
The third explanatory variable is the Credit growth rate (CGRit), which is computed 
using CCR data. This variable is included to capture the various channels through which 
credit growth can have an impact on default ratios. First, increases in outstanding credit will 
have a contemporaneous effect on both DRSL and DRNB, simply by raising the 
denominator of both ratios. However, this effect will fade with the inherent credit life cycle 
since some time is needed between the moment money is lent (where all the loans are 
standard) and the moment a borrowers’ payment is declared in arrears (usually, the 
proportion of loans going into arrears grows for the first two years, peaks, and then starts 
falling). Additionally, a strong increase in credit approvals might signal a deterioration of 
credit standards and, therefore, a future increase in both default measures (Gross and 
Souleles, 2002; Salas and Saurina, 2002).  
For the estimation of equation 4, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using the first 
difference of the regression to remove each specific non-observable effect in respect of the 
provinces ( i ). However, this process of taking out the individual effect introduces a 
correlation between the new error term ( ti, ) and the lagged dependent variable ( ljtiy , 1,  ). 
Hence, the lags of the explanatory variables in levels are used as instruments, to address 
both correlation and endogeneity. Moreover, when applying first differences, the stationarity of 
regressors is ensured. GMM estimator consistency depends on two assumptions: i) the 
random error ( ti, ) does not present serial correlation of second order and ii) the validity of 
the instruments (see Arrellano and Bond, 1991). Both assumptions are tested using a serial 
correlation test and a Sargan test, respectively. We also assume that   0, 2,   itljti uyE , 
allowing us to exploit the additional moment conditions for the equations in levels, which 
provides an improvement in efficiency and a reduction in finite sample bias, particularly if 
default measures are persistent. We use an incremental Sargan test to test for these 
additional overindentifying conditions. In this way, we obtain consistent and efficient estimates 
and control for endogeneity in all the regressors. 
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4 Results 
Estimation results (two-step system GMM estimations) for equation (4) are shown in Table 1 for 
the DRSL and in Table 2 for the DRNB. In all cases, non-statistically significant lags have been 
removed from the final model. As can be seen, for all models Sargan tests support the validity of 
the instruments used, while serial correlation tests also accept the correlation for the first lag and 
reject the correlation for the second lag, as we would expect in a properly specified DPD.  
Although the model has been estimated using panel data for the 50 Spanish provinces, 
the results are valid for the whole country. Indeed, we can use the estimated coefficients to 
recover the expected default ratios for Spain. In order to do this, we use the information on each 
province to obtain provincial estimators of the corresponding default ratios and, from these, the 
Spanish default ratio is obtained by computing a mean weighted by credit size or number of 
borrowers, depending on the default definition used. As can be seen in Figure 5, this weighted 
mean, when compared with the observed level of default ratios, shows that the models are able 
to capture the cyclical behaviour of the different definitions of default. 
In all the models considered, the results are similar in terms of both the signs and the 
statistical significance of the coefficients. The signs of the coefficients are in line with those 
that we were expecting. In particular, the coefficient of the lagged LHS variable is positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient is relatively high, reflecting the strong inertia in these 
variables. In the case of the DRSL variable, the high inertia could be partly explained by the 
carryover effect of the former regulation in place up to 20045. However, this is not the only 
source of inertia, since it also appears, although to a lesser extent, for the DRNB variable, 
which is not affected by this effect. 
Regarding the variable CGR, the contemporaneous coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant (i.e. an increase in credit is associated with a fall in default ratios). This 
effect captures the impact of the expansion of the credit pool to new loans that are initially 
classified as standard. But the lagged CGR variables are positive and statistically significant 
up to the third lag, implying that the initial drop subsides in subsequent periods when a 
proportion of the new loans granted move into the default categories.  
The variable UR  affects both DRSL and DRNB with a positive sign both 
contemporaneously and with some lags. The existence of lags can be justified by the 
existence of unemployment benefits, personal savings and financial support from other 
members of the family, elements that can in the short term support the ability of unemployed 
borrowers to repay their loans. Therefore, it could take some time before loans extended to 
borrowers who became unemployed are classified as doubtful or in arrears. 
Finally, as expected, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and/or lagged  IDB 
variable are positive and significant (except the third lag in the DRSL and DRNB models for 
secured loans). This variable also has lagged effects on default ratios, but to a lesser extent 
than the case of the UR. This latter feature can be justified by the non-existence, in the case 
of the IDB, of a transitory complementary shock equivalent to the unemployment benefits in 
the case of the UR.  
                                                                          
5. See more details in Annex 1. 
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The size of the estimated coefficients is not a good proxy of the impact of each 
variable on the dependent variable. In order to do this, we need to compute some form of 
impulse-response function that allows us to take into account not only the contemporaneous 
effects of the RHS variables, but also their lags. Given the non-linear nature of the logit 
transformations used in the model (equation 3), these effects differ in size depending on the 
actual level of the LHS variable. Hence, in order to produce impulse-response functions or 
any sensitivity analysis, the selection of the initial position has a non-negligible effect.  
To illustrate these effects we have used a base case where all the variables (y, CGR, 
UR  and IDB ) take as starting values the levels they had in 2006 for the whole country, 
the final year on a series of stable default ratios. For subsequent periods, we have assumed 
that the UR and IDB would remain unchanged. In the latter, increases equal to zero would be 
attained by considering that interest rates would not change, and credit increased at the 
same speed as nominal disposable income. Therefore, CGR has been set to the long-term 
average growth of nominal gross disposable income. 
This base case is then compared with alternative scenarios in which the RHS 
variables are increased by 1 pp in year 0, remaining unchanged for the rest of the horizon. 
That implies a permanent increase in the original variables since the RHS variables are 
expressed in differences. Differences between these two scenarios (the base case and that 
with the shock) allow us to perform something similar to an impulse-response analysis for the 
estimated models. The results of these exercises are shown in Figure 6a and 6b (where the 
cumulative effects on the LHS variables are presented). 
As can be seen in all panels of Figures 6a and 6b, the shocks analysed produce a 
transitory effect on default ratios, a feature that is a consequence of the specification used in 
which variables enter in differences and not in levels. These transitory effects are consistent 
with the fact that being in default is a transitory situation in that loans classified as in arrears or 
doubtful ultimately become either standard (if the borrower repays the amount of debt owed), 
are amortised (if the borrower repays in full the loans) or removed from the balance sheets 
(write-offs). The maximum effect in the level is reached between one and three years after the 
shock, depending on the variable.  
Another interesting feature of the results is that, under the two definitions of default, 
the default ratio for secured loans appears to be less sensitive to changes in the RHS 
variables, especially in the case of the unemployment rate. This result is consistent with the 
less marked cyclical pattern of default ratios for this type of loan that was reported in section 
2, a feature that reflects the lower incentives to default that the holders of these loans 
normally have when they face adverse shocks that impact their ability to repay their loans.  
The comparison between the two definitions of default shows that DRSL is generally 
more sensitive to shocks, especially in the case of the UR, again a feature which is consistent 
with the findings in Section 2. As explained in Section 2, this pattern probably reflects the fact 
that the probability of default tends to be more sensitive to shocks for relatively new loans, 
which tend to be of a higher amount compared with older ones. 
The increase in the level of credit entails in all cases a contemporaneous fall in both 
definitions of default. But during the following periods the default ratios tend to increase and, 
two or three years after the shock these ratios stand above the value of the base case 
scenario. This reflects the dynamic behaviour of the probability of default for a vintage of 
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loans. Initially, the probability of default is very low since banks only extend loans to clients 
with a sound financial position. But later the probability of default tends to increase since 
adverse shocks impact a proportion of these borrowers. After some time (normally after the 
third year), the probability of default starts to decline since the outstanding amount of the debt 
tends to decrease and also, as a consequence, the debt burden falls. Conversely, a fall in 
credit growth would produce a similar effect but in the opposite direction. 
A 1pp increase in the unemployment rate produces a significant impact on default 
ratios. As commented above, the effect is higher in the case of the DRNB than in the DRSL 
and, among debt classes, it is more marked for unsecured loans. The contemporaneous 
effect shows the greater magnitude, although the ratio continues to increase in subsequent 
years, reaching a maximum difference over the base case in the third year after the shock. 
Afterwards, the reduction in the default measures takes a considerable period of time. 
The increase in the IDB produces a faster response in the default measures 
compared to the impact associated with the rise in UR, with the cumulated effect peaking 
between one and two years after the shock. Reversion to the long-term value is also faster 
than that found in the case of a shock to the UR.  
Another way of looking at the effect of the three independent variables on the 
default measure is by analysing the contribution of each to the recent upward trend in 
household financial distress6. Figure 7 presents the results of this exercise. As can be seen, 
all three variables contributed in 2007 and 2008 to the increase in default ratios. The surge 
in the unemployment rate is the main driver of the upward trend in the default measures, 
followed by sharp deceleration of credit. In 2009, unemployment continued to be the main 
variable pushing default ratios upwards, but the reduction in interest rates observed since 
the end of 2008 has somewhat eased the increase in these ratios, especially in the case of 
secured loans. 
The model underestimates the increase in 2007 and 2008 and overestimates that 
in 2009. These errors in timing might partly be a consequence of the change in the 
regulation in 2004 that has meant an earlier recognition of doubtful loans as compared to 
the previous regulation in place for most of the sample period analysed. However, other 
factors apart from this must account for these errors, since they are also observed in the 
case of the definition based on the number of borrowers in default (albeit to a lesser 
extent), for which this effect is not present. 
  
                                                                          
6. See annex 2 for a detailed explanation of how this contribution has been computed. 
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5 Alternative specifications 
5.1 Banks vs. savings banks 
In order to check whether there are significant differences among credit institutions we 
have split our sample into two sub-samples, comprising, respectively, the loans granted by 
banks and savings banks. Both types of credit institutions represent more than 80% of all 
unsecured debt in the period analysed and more than 90% of secured debt (see figure 8). 
In the latter case, savings banks are the main players, accounting for a market share that 
has never fallen below 50%, while banks’ market share has ranged from 25% to 40%. The 
gap between them was wider during the crisis in the early 90s, but has narrowed 
significantly in the second half of the decade and the opening years of the new century, 
remaining relatively stable until the end of the sample. In the case of unsecured loans, 
banks had a higher market share at the beginning of the sample period, although this has 
been smoothly declining since then. By contrast, savings banks started with a lower market 
share (especially if we measure the market by the size of the loans), but have been gaining 
market share throughout the sample period, surpassing banks in the second half of the 
90s. In terms of numbers of borrowers, differences are not so clear, so gains in terms of 
size of unsecured loans seem to have come via increases in the quantity of the individual 
loans granted by savings banks. 
Regarding the dynamics of the default measures, as can be seen in Figure 8, the 
cyclical pattern of the default we showed for the aggregate sample in previous sections is 
also present for both sub-samples. Additionally, the portfolio of unsecured loans has a more 
volatile pattern in both sub-samples, as it is also the case for the default specification based 
on the size of the loans. Nevertheless, we can also see some differences between banks’ and 
savings banks’ default ratios. Banks’ default ratios are, in general, more sensitive to the cycle 
than savings banks’ equivalent measures (default ratios peak at higher levels). This is 
especially the case for unsecured debt, where the heterogeneity of the portfolio could lead to 
differences in the type of loans granted by both types of institutions. By contrast, in the last 
cycle of increasing default ratios, the default ratios for savings banks’ secured loans have 
increased somewhat more than the corresponding variables for banks, a pattern that has not 
been observed for unsecured loans. 
Given these differences in the dynamics of the default measures, we have estimated 
separately models for the two types of institutions to see to what extent we can improve in 
this way the results obtained from the aggregated models estimated in the previous section. 
In table 3, we present the results for the same models we specified in the previous section, 
but with separate estimations for the loan portfolios of banks and savings banks. As can be 
seen, all the models show the same features we found for the sample that included all types 
of credit institutions. Both signs and level of significance are similar, as are the dynamics. 
Nevertheless, the values are different, although the exact consequences of these differences 
are difficult to discern from the estimated parameters. In order to do this, we have computed 
the same impulse-response exercises as in the previous sections. The results of this exercise 
are shown in Figures 9a and 9b. 
As can be seen, the results of the impulse-response exercise show features similar 
to those we found for the previous models, both in terms of the direction of the effects and 
the size. However, we also observe divergences in the dynamic effects when we compare 
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banks and savings banks. In the case of the models for the DRSL for secured debt (Figure 
9a, left-hand panels), differences between credit institutions are small, with a lower 
persistence of the effects for the banks sub-sample. For the unsecured loans (Figure 9a, 
right-hand panels), DRSL measures are considerably more sensitive to unemployment and 
interest debt burden shocks for loans granted by banks than those granted by savings banks. 
They are also quite persistent, not tailing off completely at the end of the exercise horizon. 
The shock to credit growth is somehow different for banks, where there are two periods of 
default reductions after the shock, reducing the subsequent positive effect compared to the 
saving banks sub-sample.  
When we use the DRNB alternative measure (Figure 9b), the results are similar to 
those of the DRSL, although the effects tend to be higher for the banks’ loans sub-sample. In 
the case of unsecured debt (Figure 9b, right-hand panels), the degree of persistence is much 
lower than that we find for the DRSL measure, and more in line with that of the whole sample. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the credit growth rate shock, the negative initial effect continues 
for an extra period, in contrast to the other samples and default measures, as a consequence 
of the negative coefficient of the first lag of the variable (see Table 3). 
As can be seen in Figure 10, both for banks and savings banks we find a positive 
fitting error for 2008 and a negative one for 2009, in line with the results based on the whole 
sample. Compared with the models estimated for the whole sample, the fitting errors in 2009 
are much lower for both sub-samples. However, for 2008 the fitting errors of the sub-samples 
are similar or somewhat higher than is the case for the whole sample. 
5.2 Asymmetric effect of the unemployment ratio 
As mentioned in the previous section, the increase in the default ratios after the outbreak of 
the crisis in 2008 was faster than expected by the estimated models (see figures 7 and 10). 
One possible explanation for this puzzle could be the asymmetric effect that unemployment 
may have on default ratios. Our sample of indebted people only comprises people who 
were employed at the time of obtaining the loan (in Spain, it is seldom the case that loans 
are granted to people that has presented no documentation). Therefore, an increase in 
unemployment may affect the whole group of indebted people whereas a reduction would 
positively affect only a fraction of borrowers (those who have lost their job after taking out 
the loan). As a result, we would expect an increase in the unemployment ratio to have a 
greater impact on default ratios than a decrease in the same unemployment ratio, since the 
number of people potentially affected is higher in the former case. 
To test this hypothesis, we have included an additional RHS variable, UR (+), which 
is equal to UR when there is an increase in the unemployment ratio and zero otherwise. If 
the effects of UR on defaults are symmetric, we would expect UR (+) not to be significant. 
The results of the estimation of this model are presented in Table 4. 
The estimated models, when compared with the models with a symmetric effect of 
UR (Table 1 and 2), present very similar coefficients for the variables that have not changed 
(Default, CGR and IDB). In the case of UR (+), the contemporaneous coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant for all the specified models, implying that the previous hypothesis 
holds. An increase in the unemployment ratio (UR + UR (+)) has a positive effect on the 
default ratios that is much larger than the negative effect of a reduction in the unemployment 
ratio. In fact, the sum of the contemporaneous coefficients of UR and UR (+) is higher than 
that observed for UR in the symmetric models (Table 1 and 2). By contrast, for the lagged 
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variable there is no significant difference between positive and negative movements of UR, 
but the estimated values, in most cases, tend to be lower than those we had for the 
symmetric specification. 
In this context, these models are able to explain the surge in the default ratios 
observed in 2008, derived from the increase in unemployment experienced by the Spanish 
economy since the beginning of the financial crisis, reflecting the greater impact on the 
contemporaneous default ratios and a lower persistence in the subsequent periods. As we 
did in the previous section, we present in Figure 11 the fitting errors for the 2007-2009 period. 
As can be seen, the errors are close to zero for 2008, and the size of the negative errors in 
2009 is of a smaller magnitude than those we have for the symmetric models of Tables 1 and 2. 
In order words, this evidence suggests that the inclusion of asymmetries helps to improve 
significantly the performance of the model. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have presented the estimation results of models that explain the dynamic 
behaviour of default ratios in Spain for loans extended to the household sector. More 
specifically, we have used two alternative definitions of default: the proportion of the 
outstanding amount of loans in default and the proportion of borrowers with defaulted loans. 
For each definition we have estimated two models: one for secured loans and another for 
unsecured loans. The dataset used to estimate the models consists of a panel of 50 
provinces, and covers the period 1984-2009, including the last two crises of the Spanish 
economy. The models have been estimated using two-step system GMM. 
The results of the models show that the dynamic behaviour of the default ratios of 
loans extended to Spanish households can be reasonably well characterised with the following 
variables: the lagged LHS variable, and the contemporaneous and the lagged values of credit 
growth, the unemployment rate and the interest debt burden. The coefficients of these variables 
are all significant and present the expected sign in all the estimated equations. However, there 
are some differences in the sensitivity of default to shocks to the independent variables 
depending on the definition of default and the type of loan. In particular, the definition of default 
based on size of loans tends to be more sensitive to shocks than that based on the number of 
borrowers in default. This is probably related to the fact that relatively new loans, for which the 
probability of default is normally more sensitive to shocks, tend to be of a higher amount. By 
loan classes, we have found that the sensitivity to shocks is higher for unsecured loans, a 
feature that probably reflects the comparatively higher incentives to default for this type of loan.  
The impulse-response functions show that shocks to independent variables have a 
transitory effect on default. This feature, which is a consequence of the specification in 
differences of the RHS variables of the model, captures the fact that being in default is a 
transitory situation. However, the effects are relatively persistent. 
According to the estimated results, the increase in the unemployment rate was the 
main driver of the sharp rise in default ratios between 2007 and 2009. The fall in interest rates 
since the end of 2008 contributed to moderating the upward path of default ratios in 2009. 
However, the model underestimates the increase in 2007 and 2008 and overestimates the 
increase in 2009. These errors in timing might partly be a consequence of the change in 
regulations in 2004, which involved an earlier recognition of doubtful loans as compared with 
the regulations in place for most of the sample period analysed. However, other factors apart 
from this should account for these errors, since they are also observed in the case of the 
definition based on the number of borrowers in default, for which this effect is not present. 
We have also estimated the same models for two separate sub-samples of loans 
granted by banks and savings banks, respectively. Although the models are qualitatively 
similar, they differ quantitatively, showing differing sensitivity to the economic cycle. 
We have also found strong evidence of asymmetric effects of unemployment on the 
default measures. In particular, we find that an increase in the unemployment ratio has a sharper 
impact on default ratios than a reduction in unemployment. The introduction of this feature into 
the model helps to improve its performance. More specifically, we show that a model that 
includes asymmetric effects can better explain the recent developments in default ratios. 
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Annex 1: Definitions  
Spanish CCR classifies all loans in four different categories7: standard, doubtful due to 
customer arrears (arrears), doubtful for reasons other than customer arrears (doubtful) 
and write-offs. Standard loans are those loans that, according to the rules of the Banco 
de España, are not classified in any of the other three previous categories (CBE 4/2004, 
Annex IX, page 4). 
The total amount of a loan must be considered to be in arrears by a bank if any portion 
of the loan (principal, interest or contractually agreed expenses) is past-due by more than three 
months. This category will also include the amounts of all the transactions of a customer if the 
balances classified as doubtful due to arrears exceed 25% of the total outstanding debt with the 
bank (CBE 4/2004, Annex IX, page 6). Previous legislation (CBE 4/1991) restricted the so-called 
transaction carryover effect, since it established that one of the following two conditions had to 
apply for this to occur: the accumulated past-due amounts classified as doubtful due to arrears 
had to exceed 25% of the amount payable; or there had to be amounts past-due by more than 
12 months (6 months in the cases of mortgages and consumer credit). For instance, consider a 
mortgage of €100,000 and that by January a payment of €3,000 is missed. Under CBE 4/1991, 
by April, €3,000 would have been classified as in arrears while the remaining €97,000 would still 
be standard. By July, the entire amount would have been considered in arrears. Under new 
legislation (CBE 4/2004), the €100,000 would be in arrears since April. This change implies that, 
in the current cycle (after the legislative change), doubtful credit will grow faster than expected 
by previous cycle observations. 
The category of other doubtful loans includes those loans which, although they are 
not classifiable as doubtful due to customer arrears, pose reasonable doubts regarding their 
full repayment under the contractual terms (CBE 4/2004, Annex IX, page 7). This includes 
those cases where borrowers moves into a situation where there is a significant deterioration 
in their solvency, such as general delays in payment, insufficient income to meet debts or the 
impossibility of obtaining further financing.  
Finally, Write-offs include the amount of debt instruments for which the bank, after 
analysing them individually, considers the possibility of recovery to be remote and proceeds 
to derecognise them (CBE 4/2004, Annex IX, page 7). Once a loan has been classified as 
doubtful due to arrears for more than four years, it must be classified as a write-off. This is 
also the case for all debits from customers that are declared subject to bankruptcy 
proceedings for which there is notice that the liquidation phase has been or is to be declared, 
or whose solvency has undergone a notable and irreversible deterioration. Given the long 
period that a loan must be in arrears to be classified as a write-off, they are more likely to 
represent financial problems that households had in the past rather than actual financial 
stress. In fact, they are usually excluded from the definition of default. 
The pace of write-offs would depend on the provisioning calendar. Banks could 
provision loans in arrears faster under CBE 4/2004 (Annex IX, page 13); but the floor is given 
by the following table: 
                                                                          
7. Banco de España (2004), Circular 4/2004, Annex IX (Boletín Oficial del Estado, no. 314, 30 December 2004). 
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Unsecured debt Secured debt 
(loans secured by completed houses) 
Up to 6 months 4.5% Over 3 years and up to 4 years 25% 
Over 6 months and up to 12 27.4% Over 4 years and up to 5 years 50% 
Over 12 months and up to 18 60.5% Over 5 years and up to 6 years 75% 
Over 18 months and up to 24 93.3% Over 6 years 100% 
Over 24 months 100%   
 
Therefore, loans without guarantee may move from the in arrears category to 
write-off in two years, while mortgages would take longer. This calendar is similar to that 
previously established by CBE 4/1991, the main difference being with regard to the time 
at which provisions reach 100% of the loan, which in the case of unsecured loans was 
reduced to 21 months. 
Nevertheless, new CBE 3/2010 establishes a single provisions calendar for both 
secured and unsecured debt, reducing considerably the maximum time to fully provision a 
loan. Nevertheless, in the case of secured loans, CBE 3/2010 established that provisions 
should not be necessary for the portion of the loan that could be recovered by repossession 
of the guarantee (establishing maximum amounts depending on the type of guarantee, first-
residence houses, other finished houses or other real estate). 
All debt 
Up to 6 months 25% 
Over 6 months and up to 9 50% 
Over 9 months and up to 12 75% 
Over 12 months 100% 
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Annex 2: Computation of the individual contribution of each variable to the changes 
in the default ratio.  
The computation of the contribution of the individual effects is not a straightforward task. To 
illustrate this we are going to consider the case of the effect of changes in the CGR on the 
DRSL. Firstly, the default ratios have been transformed to estimate the DPD models, and this 
logit transformation must be reversed. Therefore, the contemporaneous impact of the CGR 
on DRSL is computed following equation A1. 
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As can be seen in equation A.1, the influence of the CGR, will be magnified by the 
level of the DRSL, increasing the impact of the variable for higher DRSL. 
Secondly, past movements of the CGR are also affecting the present movements of 
DRSL through two different channels. One is the direct channel estimated in the model by the 
lagged variables (lagged 1, 2 and 3 years). But there is a second channel, since lagged 
default rates are also present in the DPD model. Therefore, previous changes in CGR will 
influence the actual movements of the DRSL, according to equations A2, A3 and A4. 
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For higher order of lags, the variable is not present in the model, but the influence is 
derived from the lagged y of the model. 
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Finally, the overall effect of CGR over DRSL (ECGR) will be the sum of all the individual 
effects: 
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FIGURE 1: Default ratios and unemployment rate in Spain between 1984 and 2009. 
 
FIGURE 2: Default ratios between 1984 and 2009 (distribution by province). 
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FIGURE 3: Default ratios (annual variation) between 1985 and 2009 
(distribution by province). 
 
FIGURE 4: Change in the unemployment rate (distribution by province). 
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FIGURE 5: Default ratios in Spain between 1984 and 2009.  
Model estimates vs. observed data. 
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FIGURE 6a: Impact on default ratios of shocks in independent variables  
(credit growth rate, change in the unemployment rate and change in the interest 
debt burden). 
 
95% confidence bands have been added (dotted lines), by performing a Montecarlo Simulation of the parameters in the 
DPD models, using normal multivariate distribution with the mean and the variance-covariance matrix obtained from the 
estimated system GMM. 
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FIGURE 6b: Cumulative impact on default ratios of shocks in independent  
variables (credit growth rate, change in the unemployment rate and change  
in the interest debt burden). 
 
95% confidence bands have been added (dotted lines), by performing a Montecarlo Simulation of the parameters in the 
DPD models, using normal multivariate distribution with the mean and the variance-covariance matrix obtained from the 
estimated system GMM. 
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FIGURE 7: Factors accounting for the recent increase in default ratios. 
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FIGURE 8: Default ratios and market share between 1984 and 2009.  
Banks vs. Saving Banks 
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FIGURE 9a: Cumulative impact on the DRSL of banks and savings banks  
of shocks in independent variables (credit growth rate, change in the unemployment 
rate and change in the interest debt burden). 
 
95% confidence bands have been added (dotted lines), by performing a Montecarlo Simulation of the parameters in the 
DPD models, using normal multivariate distribution with the mean and the variance-covariance matrix obtained from the 
estimated system GMM. 
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FIGURE 9b: Cumulative impact on the DRNB of banks and savings banks  
of shocks in independent variables (credit growth rate, change in the unemployment 
rate and change in the interest debt burden). 
 
95% confidence bands have been added (dotted lines), by performing a Montecarlo Simulation of the parameters in the 
DPD models, using normal multivariate distribution with the mean and the variance-covariance matrix obtained from the 
estimated system GMM. 
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FIGURE 10: Fitting error in the recent increase in default ratios.  
Differences between models estimated for the whole sample and sub-samples  
with the portfolios of banks and savings banks, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 11: Fitting error in the recent increase in the default ratios.  
Differences between models estimated with a symmetric and asymmetric effect  
of changes in the unemployment ratio on default measures. 
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Table 1. Estimated DPD models for DRSL logit transformations. 
All regressions are system GMM estimated with Stata v.11 (using xtdpd function); estimation and z stats are obtained 
from two step robust standard errors; individual observations are annual data of Spanish provinces from 1988 to 2009. 
In a system GMM both the level and difference equations are estimated, using a separate set of instruments. In the 
equation in differences, we have used as instruments for each year the second lag of y, CGR, UR and IDB. In the level 
equation, we have used as instruments for each year the variables in differences, lagged 2 periods for y and 4 periods 
for CGR, UR and IDB. Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the overidentification instruments for the GMM 
estimators are valid. We also perform an Incremental Sargan test for the validity of the instruments in the level equation 
(null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid). M1 and M2 are the test of first and second order serial correlation (a 
correct dpd specification should show correlation for the first lag but no correlation for the second one). 
 z P>|z|  z P>|z|
y j
   L1. 0.764 19.6 0.000 0.836 27.8 0.000
CGR -0.857 -2.9 0.004 -0.679 -6.5 0.000
   L1. 0.923 4.7 0.000 0.409 2.8 0.006
   L2. 0.659 2.3 0.019 0.190 1.9 0.059
   L3. 0.632 2.1 0.034 0.555 3.9 0.000
  UR 10.569 10.3 0.000 7.336 11.5 0.000
   L1. 5.313 6.7 0.000 3.401 6.5 0.000
   L2. 4.674 6.5 0.000 2.894 5.4 0.000
   L3. 5.743 5.5 0.000 3.335 4.2 0.000
  IDB 2.688 6.0 0.000 0.738 1.8 0.069
   L1. 2.564 6.0 0.000 1.954 6.2 0.000
   L2. 0.519 1.9 0.065
   L3. -1.574 -3.2 0.001
Intercept -1.317 -5.2 0.000 -0.547 -3.9 0.000
Number of observations 1100 1100
Number of groups 50 50
Wald  2 10054.3 0.000 8360.17 0.000
Serial correlation test 
   M1 -4.6 0.000 -5.2 0.000
   M2 -0.8 0.443 -0.5 0.593
Sargan test 47.3 1.000 48.6 1.000 
Incremental Sargan Test 0.4 1.000 1.2 1.000 
(Secured Debt)
DRSL
(Unsecured Debt)
DRSL
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Table 2. Estimated DPD models for DRNB logit transformations. 
 
All regressions are system GMM estimated with Stata v.11 (using xtdpd function); estimation and z stats are obtained 
from two step robust standard errors; individual observations are annual data of Spanish provinces from 1988 to 2009. 
In a system GMM both the level and difference equations are estimated, using a separate set of instruments. In the 
equation in differences, we have used as instruments for each year the second lag of y, CGR, UR and IDB. In the level 
equation, we have used as instruments for each year the variables in differences, lagged 2 periods for y and 4 periods 
for CGR, UR and IDB. Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the overidentification instruments for the GMM 
estimators are valid. We also perform an Incremental Sargan test for the validity of the instruments in the level equation 
(null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid). M1 and M2 are the test of first and second order serial correlation (a 
correct dpd specification should show correlation for the first lag but no correlation for the second one). 
 
  
 z P>|z|  z P>|z|
y j
   L1. 0.800 23.2 0.000 0.779 21.9 0.000
CGR -0.784 -3.4 0.001 -0.537 -5.6 0.000
   L1. 0.392 2.9 0.004 0.469 4.9 0.000
   L2. 0.287 1.8 0.076 0.302 2.8 0.005
   L3. 0.904 4.2 0.000 0.369 4.7 0.000
 UR 6.727 10.7 0.000 5.331 11.0 0.000
   L1. 4.811 9.1 0.000 2.678 9.0 0.000
   L2. 2.544 4.3 0.000 2.034 4.0 0.000
   L3. 3.142 4.8 0.000
 IDB 2.276 6.8 0.000 0.778 2.8 0.005
   L1. 1.665 4.1 0.000 1.536 5.3 0.000
   L2. 0.562 3.1 0.002
   L3. -2.131 -5.5 0.000
Intercept -1.098 -5.5 0.000 -0.782 -5.5 0.000
Number of observations 1100 1100
Number of groups 50 50
Wald 2 7565.2 0.000 12469.2 0.000
Serial correlation test
   M1 -5.3 0.000 -5.6 0.000
   M2 1.0 0.315 -1.1 0.251
Sargan test 48.7 1.000 48.6 1.000
Incremental Sargan test 0.2 1.000 0.5 1.000
(Unsecured Debt)
DRNB
(Secured Debt)
DRNB
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Table 3: Estimated DPD models for DRSL and DRNB logit transformations.  
Banks vs. Savings Banks 
 
All regressions are system GMM estimated with Stata v.11 (using xtdpd function); estimation and z stats are obtained 
from two step robust standard errors; individual observations are annual data of Spanish provinces from 1988 to 2009. 
In a system GMM both the level and difference equations are estimated, using a separate set of instruments. In the 
equation in differences, we have used as instruments for each year the second lag of y, CGR, UR and IDB. In the level 
equation, we have used as instruments for each year the variables in differences, lagged 2 periods for y and 4 periods 
for CGR, UR and IDB. Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the overidentification instruments for the GMM 
estimators are valid. We also perform an Incremental Sargan test for the validity of the instruments in the level equation 
(null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid). M1 and M2 are the test of first and second order serial correlation (a 
correct dpd specification should show correlation for the first lag but no correlation for the second one). 
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Table 4: Estimated DPD models for DRSL and DRNB logit transformations. 
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric employment effects 
 
All regressions are system GMM estimated with Stata v.11 (using xtdpd function); estimation and z stats are obtained 
from two step robust standard errors; individual observations are annual data of Spanish provinces from 1988 to 2009. 
In a system GMM both the level and difference equations are estimated, using a separate set of instruments. In the 
equation in differences, we have used as instruments for each year the second lag of y, CGR, UR, UR(+) and IDB. In 
the level equation, we have used as instruments for each year the variables in differences, lagged 2 periods for y and 4 
periods for CGR, UR,UR(+) and IDB. Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the overidentification instruments for 
the GMM estimators are valid. We also perform an Incremental Sargan test for the validity of the instruments in the level 
equation (null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid). M1 and M2 are the test of first and second order serial 
correlation (a correct dpd specification should show correlation for the first lag but no correlation for the second one). 
 
 
 z P>|z|  z P>|z|  z P>|z|  z P>|z|
y j
   L1. 0.744 22.5 0.000 0.839 26.8 0.000 0.776 27.7 0.000 0.803 24.5 0.000
CGR -0.532 -2.2 0.029 -0.591 -5.6 0.000 -0.409 -2.0 0.045 -0.393 -4.0 0.000
   L1. 0.948 5.3 0.000 0.379 3.3 0.001 0.476 3.1 0.002 0.427 4.0 0.000
   L2. 0.645 2.5 0.012 0.203 2.4 0.019 0.344 2.6 0.010 0.289 3.4 0.001
   L3. 0.779 2.8 0.005 0.529 4.9 0.000 0.898 4.9 0.000 0.355 4.5 0.000
  UR 3.546 2.5 0.014 3.497 3.8 0.000
   L1. 4.986 5.8 0.000 3.388 8.8 0.000 4.146 7.4 0.000 2.530 9.0 0.000
   L2. 4.822 6.6 0.000 2.989 6.0 0.000 2.356 4.0 0.000 2.124 4.9 0.000
   L3. 6.100 6.3 0.000 3.150 4.4 0.003 0.993 1.7 0.096 2.963 5.1 0.000
  UR (+) 11.320 4.6 0.000 5.698 3.8 0.000 12.204 11.8 0.000 8.081 12.7 0.000
   L1.
   L2.
   L3.
  IDB 2.507 6.4 0.000 0.658 1.8 0.072 2.047 7.2 0.000 0.807 3.4 0.001
   L1. 2.211 5.2 0.000 1.909 6.5 0.000 1.440 4.2 0.000 1.572 6.2 0.000
   L2. 0.615 1.9 0.053 0.813 4.2 0.000
   L3. -0.929 -2.6 0.010 -1.545 -5.2 0.000
Intercept -1.627 -7.3 0.000 -0.603 -4.6 0.000 -1.435 -8.4 0.000 -0.784 -5.9 0.000
# of observations 1100 1100 1100 1100
# of groups 50 50 50 50
Wald 2 12337 0.000 13909 0.000 8609 0.000 12488 0.000
Serial correlation test
   M1 -4.7 0.000 -5.2 0.000 -5.4 0.000 -5.8 0.000
   M2 -0.5 0.620 -0.8 0.451 0.3 0.775 -1.7 0.085
Sargan test 48.7 1.000 47.8 1.000 47.6 1.000 48.9 1.000
Incremental Sargan test 0.4 1.000 0.5 1.000 0.2 1.000 0.5 1.000
DRSL DRNB
Secured Debt Unsecured Debt Secured Debt Unsecured Debt
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